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1 Are the estimate interval sensitive?
Trade agreements between countries existed long before the advent of the World Trade
Organization or even the General Agreement on Tariff and Trade (GATT). Nevertheless,
regional trade agreements have been proliferating rapidly over past few decades. As of 2020,
the number of cumulative number of RTAs in force reaches to 307. There has been renewed
interest in RTAs in the two decades especially after the Doha round talks stalled. In response
to the proliferation of RTAs, there has been a growing literature focused on the trade impact
of economic integration.
For empirical estimation of the trade-effect economic integration agreements on bilateral
trade flows, gravity trade model has been a common approach. Earlier gravity literature is
mostly consisted of cross sectional, and since 1990s studies shifted to apply panel econometric
techniques. These studies applied estimation of annual trade data over consecutive years.
However, it is logical to expect that the adjustment of trade flows in response to trade
policy changes will not be instantaneous. Given this, discouraged trade estimations pooled
over consecutive years. Given this, Trefler (2004) discouraged trade estimations pooled
over consecutive years. Moreover, as noted by Cheng, Wall, et al. (2005), “Fixed-effects
estimations are sometimes criticized when applied to data pooled over consecutive years on
the grounds that dependent and independent variables cannot fully adjust in a single year’s
time.” Woolridge (2009) shows the reduction in standard errors of coefficient estimates using
changes over longer periods of time than using year-to-year changes (p.459). Furthermore,
Olivero and Yotov (2012) provides empirical evidence that gravity estimates obtained with
3-year and 5-year interval trade data are very similar, while estimations performed with
panel samples pooled over consecutive years produce suspicious estimates of the trade cost
elasticity parameters.
Following this, researchers have used panel data with intervals instead of data pooled over
consecutive years. Table 1 presents a few studies which involve estimation of the impact of
economic integration using year intervals. In general, the studies with relatively shorter time
series chose a shorter interval size.
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Table 1: Some studies using interval data
Study Time Period Interval
Anderson and Yotov (2020) 1988-2006 & 2000-2014 3-year
Freeman and Pienknagura (2019) 1965-2010 5-year
Admassu (2019) 1970-2010 5-year
Oberhofer and Pfaffermayr (2018) 1994-2012 3-year
Gil-Pareja, Llorca-Vivero, and Mart́ınez-Serrano (2017) 1960-2008 4-year
Anderson and Yotov (2016) 1990-2002 4-year
Bergstrand, Larch, and Yotov (2015) 1990-2002 4-year
Kohl (2014) 1950-2010 5-year
Baier and Bergstrand (2007) 1960-200 5-year
Trefler (1993) 3-year
The current study analyzes the impact of trade agreements on bilateral exports using
gravity trade model is applied with Poisson pseudo maximum likelihood estimator. The
study investigates whether the estimation remain unchanged with different interval sizes,
or in other words, are the estimates interval sensitive? For this, annual data is analyzed
using 3-year, 4-year, and 5-year intervals. It is found that trade agreements positively affect
bilateral exports. However, the estimates are inconsistent across model specifications that
vary in terms of interval size.
1.1 Method and data
Among others, Anderson (1979), Anderson and Van Wincoop (2003), Baldwin and Taglioni
(2006) and Baier and Bergstrand (2007) present major developments in the gravity trade
model. To empirically estimate the impact of economic integration agreements, the equation
given in the following include exporter-time, importer-time and country pair fixed effects - the
structural gravity model commonly applied 1. To account for zero exports and heteroscedasticity,
the model is estimated using Poisson pseudo maximum likelihood (PPML) estimator as
suggested by Tenreyro and Silva (2006) and Silva and Tenreyro (2011) 2.
Exportsijt =exp
(
αit + βjt + γij + δ0 + δEIAsijt
)
+ǫijt (1)
In the equation, the subscripts i, j and t denote exporting country, importing country,
and time in years, respectively. The dependent variable, bilateral exports, is taken in levels,
whereas the variables of various economic integration agreements are binary in nature.
1Leads and lags of the integration variables, and intra-national trade is not included.
2Stata command “ppmlhdfe” is applied because of its fast convergence properties. For more on this, see
Correia, Guimarães, and Zylkin (2019).
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Data on trade is taken from the Direction of Trade database managed by International
Monetary Fund. The data comprise annual bilateral exports of goods in USD. The GATT
and WTO membership data came from WTO website. The information on trade agreements
sourced from Bair Bergstrand database (Baier & Bergstrand, 2015).
1.2 Results
Estimates are shown in Table 2. In the analysis, 3-year, 4-year and 5-year intervals are used
for comparison of estimates, as given in the second row of the table. For instance, 97(3)12 is
a shortened expression for 1997(3)2012 that means a time period over 1997–2012 with 3-year
intervals. It is noteworthy that all missing values of exports are taken as zero.
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Table 2: Comparison of estimates with various interval size
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
96(3)12 96(4)12 96(5)12 87(3)12 87(4)12 87(5)12 72(3)12 72(4)12 72(5)12
WTO 0.138* 0.123 −0.040 0.051 0.061 −0.082 −0.067 −0.065 −0.197**
(0.077) (0.084) (0.090) (0.072) (0.083) (0.101) (0.066) (0.073) (0.091)
NRPTA −0.004 −0.026 −0.014 −0.044 −0.036 0.020 −0.029 −0.021 0.024
(0.042) (0.043) (0.042) (0.042) (0.042) (0.042) (0.039) (0.038) (0.043)
PTA −0.057 −0.027 −0.101** 0.005 0.030 −0.005 0.057 0.081* 0.041
(0.036) (0.039) (0.042) (0.043) (0.043) (0.045) (0.042) (0.041) (0.043)
FTA 0.046 0.034 0.026 0.057* 0.055 0.053 0.127*** 0.126*** 0.119***
(0.033) (0.034) (0.037) (0.034) (0.035) (0.037) (0.033) (0.034) (0.035)
CU 0.071 0.055 0.026 0.177*** 0.217*** 0.190*** 0.330*** 0.393*** 0.351***
(0.114) (0.125) (0.120) (0.056) (0.059) (0.058) (0.051) (0.050) (0.050)
CM 0.064 0.160*** 0.054 0.187*** 0.251*** 0.186*** 0.425*** 0.502*** 0.415***
(0.055) (0.061) (0.060) (0.050) (0.056) (0.056) (0.049) (0.054) (0.053)
ECU 0.116* 0.127* 0.104 0.204*** 0.212*** 0.204*** 0.432*** 0.460*** 0.425***
(0.068) (0.071) (0.072) (0.063) (0.069) (0.068) (0.063) (0.066) (0.065)
Constant 23.095*** 23.175*** 23.336*** 23.033*** 23.105*** 23.213*** 22.926*** 23.009*** 23.131***
(0.070) (0.077) (0.083) (0.066) (0.076) (0.093) (0.061) (0.067) (0.083)
N 179,890 145,554 113,438 253,757 194,119 160,546 353,510 270,271 217,472
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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It is found that trade agreements positively affect bilateral exports in general, however,
estimates are inconsistent across model specifications that vary in terms of interval size. The
kind of “interval bias” is more prominent in case of relatively shorter time series. The finding
implies that reliability of the estimation may be undermined.The interval data approach on
one hand yield unreliable estimates. On the other hand, it misses out important information
required to analyze the trade effect of an RTA. As the trade effect of an RTA may not be
just instantaneous, it is rather spread over time. Therefore, the consecutive data should be
used for a proper analysis of the impact of RTAs on bilateral trade.
2 Some insights into the RTAs’ trade-effect
Starting with a linear model for the trade-effect of an RTA, Figure 1 show two curves.
The curve AB shows a time-invariant effect which is rather unrealistic as it assumes that
adjustment of trade flows in response to a policy change is absolutely instantaneous. On the
other hand, curve AC shows a time-invariant effect. That mean, the same RTA observed









t+2 is the underlying reason of the interval-sensitivity of the trade-effect.
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Figure 1: Time invariant versus time variant trade-effect of an RTA
The trade-effect of RTAs is actually nonlinear. Any variation in trade flow occurs as
firms response to a policy change. The adjustments may include construction of marketing
channels in the destination market where sales are expected to expand, training, product
redesigning to meet local tastes etc.
The firms’ response may be assumed to be normally distributed. That is, firms which
are relatively more informed, more efficient in terms of change management, and more risk
friendly will lead adjustment process, followed by other firms. In other words, there are fewer
early adopters, and fewer laggards, and majority of firms fall in between the two extremes.
In this way, the trade-effect of an RTA can be shown as the cumulative response, as show in
Figure 2. Over time, more and more firms get involved, and each firm involved to a larger
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extent. Therefore, the trade-effect increases over time as a result of firm adjustment to policy
change. In the figure, the dashed vertical line show the demarcation between trade-effect
increasing at an increasing rate and it increasing but at a decreasing rate. Normally, tariffs
reduction under trade agreements occurs in a gradual manner. Somewhere in the midway,
while adjustment by firm is proceeding, and tariffs are further lowered down, these two








Figure 2: Theoretical curve of the trade-effect of an RTA
Let’s suppose a simple world consisted of four countries A, B, C and D. Here, we can
denote the bilateral exports of country A to country B as XAB, bilateral exports of country
B to country A as XBA, and so on. There is a uniform tariff level τ0 between each country
pair, the value of bilateral exports between each country pair is 10 units. In this way, the
world trade is 120 units. We do not account for intra-national trade for simplicity. This is
the baseline, as depicted by the panel (a) of the Figure 3.
Now, we assume that an RTA is implemented between country A and country B resulting
into a new level of tariff τRTA between the country pair such that τRTA < τ0, shown by the
panel (b) of the figure. As a result of the lowered tariff, more firms from country A could
access export market of country B, and hence XAB increases from 10 units to 12 units.
Similar change we see for XBA. As a total of 4 units of trade is created by the RTA, the
world trade in this scenario is 124 units.
Practically, trade creation as well as trade diversion may be resulted by the implementation
of an RTA, depicted the panel (c) of the figure. In this scenario, XAB is 14 units: 2 units of
trade creation and two unit of trade diversion. Similar change we see for XBA. In this case,
the trade-effect of the RTA between country A and country B may be called the “internal
effect”, and the trade-effect along XAC , XAD, XBC , and XBD may be called “lateral effect”.
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Furthermore, there can be “external effect” as a result of the increased trade between country
C and country D due to their decreased trade with country A and country B.
Clearly, in the real world involving large number of trade partners, the lateral effect of the
RTA may not be much pronounced as the trade diversion is distributed over several countries;
and even less visible would be the external effect. However, the internal, lateral and external
( or the primary, secondary and tertiary) effects of RTAs may be more important for trade






















Figure 3: Internal, lateral and external trade-effects of an RTA
Suppose an RTA is being into force at time t. Firms in the member countries may start
adjustment to their exports already as they expect the RTA at time t−a, the adjustment
process conclude at time t+m as the RTA reaches it maturity level. As shown in the Figure
4, D1 depicts the duration to reach the full trade-effect while D
′
1 is the anticipatory part
of the duration. Similarly, D2 is the depth of the trade-effect, and D3 denote the diversion
of the trade effect as a result of the implementation of another RTA in the neighborhood.
The relative strength of each of the two RTAs, the sequence of entering into force, and the
spacing between them will determine the cumulative trade-effect. In this way, a negative
impact on the trade flow may occur for a “suppressed” RTA overridden by the diversion







Figure 4: Duration, depth, and diversion of the trade-effect of an RTA
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3 Further research on the RTAs’ trade-effect
In general, the research must emphasize on the question of “How do agreements affect trade?”
in addition to the rather simple question of “Do agreements affect trade?” using consecutive
data. That is in other words, the interplay on agreements along time as well as across
countries in order to explicitly analyze the pathway of trade effect. It would be interesting
to see how the trade-effect curve of a specific RTA, or a group of RTAs deviates from the
theoretical curve or the curve for the cumulative effect of all RTAs in force worldwide. The
attributes D′1, D1, D2, and D3 can be important in this context.
In general, there is a time gap between the RTAs are signed and they enter into force.
Even before the signing of an RTA, negotiations are officially launched. Based on such
factors, firms may start adjustment process as they anticipate the implementation of an
RTA in future, and as a result, a trade-effect be observed already before the RTA enters
into force. RTAs may vary in terms of anticipatory phase due to multiple factors: (a) the
relative importance of the prospective RTA. For instance, an RTA with the EU can be more
attractive than with some country/region of lesser economic importance; (b) the gap between
the date of signature, or even the date of launch to negotiations, and date of entry into force;
and (c) the economic environment more conducive to firm adjustment process. Related to
this, it might be interesting to analyze the impact of the “unborn” RTAs which were only
announced or signed but never implemented. Similar would be the case of RTAs announced
in the recent past, say last three years but not yet implemented.
Similarly, RTAs may vary in terms of the duration to reach the full effect level. The
adjustment process by firms may be faster for the product with lower destination-specificity.
We may hypothesize that the pace of adjustment in response to the implementation of an
RTA may vary for raw materials and intermediate goods as compared to consumption goods,
ceteris paribus. The difference of non-tariff barriers such as technical barriers to trade (TBT)
and sanitary or phytosanitary (SPS) regulations across destinations matters here.
In terms of depth, for instance, the trade-effect of the FTAs is expected to be deeper as
compared to that of the PTAs. However, not every RTA may reach to its potential depth
in case of the diversion effect by a new RTA. This would be more pronounced in case of a
“week” RTA is followed by a “strong” RTA, the later will override the trade-effect. In this
regard, it can be interesting to see the interaction between the RTA of a country with the
EU and the other RTAs of that country implemented shortly earlier.
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